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The National in the Network Society: UKUncut, the English Defence League and the challenge for 
Social Democracy. 
 
Walkers crisps: potatoes, workers, factories & Gary Lineker.  
All British, except the profits held in Switzerland to avoid tax #ukuncut 
@UKUncut Twitter 30 Jan 2011 
WHEN YOU MARCH TOMMORROW, MAKE SURE YOU REMEMBER WHY YOU ARE MARCHING, IT'S FOR 
THE SAME REASON OUR FOREFATHERS DIED. YES, TO KEEP ENGLAND FUCKING ENGLISH, NOT GERMAN 
AND DEFIANATLY NOT MUSLIM. 
BE PROUD AND BE ENGLISH.  
Comment by “Ray” on Facebook.com English Defence League (EDL) page 4 Feb 2011 
 
Introduction 
In amongst the student occupations of the winter of 2010, someone under the user name “UK People’s 
Initiative” used the social networking website Facebook to attempt to organize the dubiously named 
“Demonstration of Resistance” for the 20th of December. The online event called on activists from the 
growing protest movement to attend a march through central London against public sector cuts. Sharp 
eyed protestors picked up on a discussion of the event by supporters of the EDL on micro-blogging site 
Twitter. The right-wingers’ purported plan was to ambush and assault the demonstrators tricked into 
attending the demo. Once this was discovered the news quickly spread around Twitter, Facebook and 
on various other blogs and news feeds. Only about 20 people showed up and promptly went home: 
there was no violence. But why was a group that claims to be trying to defend English culture from 
“radical Islam” suddenly targeting its aggression at students and tax avoidance protesters? 
We believe that for the EDL, the current wave of left-orientated demonstrations across the UK 
are an encroachment on their political terrain. The anti-tax avoidance message of UKUncut – “the rich 
avoid paying their taxes, while the rest of us bear the brunt of public sector cuts” – plays into a similar 
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logic of common sense fairness that the EDL seeks to exploit. Both are also operating at similar scales, 
organising locally but coordinating nationally. Where the right seeks to build their nationalisms through 
a frame of ethnic or cultural exclusivity, the media friendly actions of UKUncut have enabled the left to 
start to articulate a different view of the nation on the basis of tax justice and public service provision. 
This may be classic centre left stuff, but it differs from the usual arguments around welfare provision by 
employing rhetoric which re-establishes the link between state and nation.  
The absence of a relationship between a British state and British nation is apparent in contrast 
to the strength of this link in Wales and Scotland since devolution, which have demonstrated that it is 
possible to construct a modern nationalism of the left. The divergence in Westminster politics as 
compared to the Holyrood and Senedd has exposed the hollowness of New Labour’s attempts to work 
with a British identity. Although the Welsh and Scottish nationalist parties derive some of their appeal 
through direct opposition to Westminster, they have also solidified their support through a robust 
defence of tax and spend. In Scotland, for instance, the case for free higher education has been made 
and won as a national value and a social good, likewise free prescriptions in Wales. 
On the other hand, the British Labour party has mostly recoiled awkwardly from using the 
language of nation, or, when it has drawn upon the ideas of patriotic virtues, it is through triangulation 
with the anti-immigration discourses of the right. The sort of populism that emerged in Gordon Brown’s 
“British Jobs, for British Workers” or David Blunkett’s idea of Britishness tests for immigrants could 
never ring true in the shadow of Blair's innumerate speeches about the necessity of globalisation, and 
the defence of hugely unpopular foreign policies on the basis of membership of a global community with 
America at the helm (Blair 2001). Blair’s early flirtation with “Cool Brittania” was the last successful 
attempt to invoke the national spirit without structuring an exclusivist identity, but its rock star aesthetic 
was never durable as a politics. Unlike the progressive nationalisms of the devolved countries in the 
union, Cool Brittania offered no future beyond the marketability of a current fad. It was short-termist, 
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playing into the cult of youth without planning for a working adult life. Labour’s attempts to use the 
language of nation also failed because they misread the driving forces shaping social relations in the 
network society, and the changing configurations of capitalism, culture and technological development.  
Both UKUncut and the EDL are savvy to what these changes mean: they are opposing forces on 
the frontline of new political configurations made possible by the increasing accessibility of 
sophisticated and scalable tools of digital communication. Yet the battle lines go beyond the politics of 
the street and deep into the foundations of our established ideologies. To confront how the politics of 
the left must adapt its thinking to this new era, it will need to rearticulate the relationship between the 
local, national and global, through the lens of the material connections between people and things that 
social network technologies make apparent.  
For social democracy, the techno-cultural shift brought about by the democratization of digital 
network technologies means there is a need to reconcile two challenges that are currently understood 
as separate, even oppositional. The first is how social democracy might reincorporate the national into 
the politics of a redistributive state to build consent for a programme of equality; the second is the 
inadequacy of centralised state control in the “network society”. 
To explain the connection between these two tasks, the term “network society” needs some 
breaking down. The “networks” referred to are multiple. Coined by Manuel Castells in the mid 1990s, it 
initially referred to the networks of global capital flows. Over time, with the mass take-up of mobile 
phones and the emergence of blogging and other social media, the concept has had to be expanded to 
include cultural and social life. In this way, the possibilities of “mass self-communication” (2009: 65-72) 
facilitated by digital networks have started to make explicit the material networks of peoples’ lived 
experience. We must now understand the “network society” as a way of describing the state of modern 
capitalism, the relationship between technologies of personal communication and culture, and the way 
in which we form and maintain relationships both individually and collectively. All three of these 
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phenomena, separately and in conjunction, are radically changing our relationships to the “imagined 
communities” of place, ethnicity and nation (Castells 2009; Anderson 1991). Within this new conceptual 
space, politics is changing fast; coalitions of interest are shifting rapidly; novel ideologies are being 
formed and old ones being revived.  
 
The network and the crisis of the nation 
To many, the idea that websites and Internet services such as Facebook and Twitter should cause a 
crisis for social democracy will seem faddish, but the reality is deeper, profoundly so. In 2006, Yochai 
Benkler was already defending such a position from accusations that it was dated: 
It seems passé today to speak of “the Internet revolution.” In some academic circles, it is 
positively naïve. But it should not be. The change brought about by the networked information 
environment is deep. It is structural. It goes to the very foundations of how liberal markets and 
liberal democracies have co-evolved for almost two centuries. (p. 1) 
 
This is a crisis point for modern politics, because since the French Revolution, and the Declaration of the 
Rights of Man, “nationalism and democracy [have been fused] in an apparently irresistible combination” 
(Gamble 1981, 133). In the “network society”, where national borders are permeable to capital, 
commodity and communication flows, and identities are constructed by leisure interests or 
consumption of global brands rather than localities or shared national cultures, the credibility of the 
nationally-bound democracy is increasingly under threat.   
Europe, as an example of multinational co-governance, could represent a new form of territorial 
identity, but this merely replicates the tension between the bordered state and the borderless network 
at a grander scale; and besides, especially in the UK, a European identity has little visceral power. The EU 
itself draws its authority from its member states and its federal functions are necessarily limited, 
wielding legislative powers, for instance, but without an independent disciplinary infrastructure: a court 
but no army, police or prisons. Across Europe, social democracy remains fundamentally predicated on 
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the state, and states still draw their authority from the discourse of the nation. It is precisely because 
networks have little respect for national borders that how it adapts to the conjunction of the nation and 
the network will determine whether social democracy remains a political force in the 21
st
 century. 
The well placed fears of revisiting nationalism which date to the 1930s and 1940s forget that it was 
initially the radical enlightenment movement in Europe, and was an assertion of the fundamental rights 
of the people against the arbitrary powers of church, monarch and aristocracy. “What is a nation?” 
asked Abbe Sieyes, in his inflammatory 1789 pamphlet. “A body of people who join together to live 
under common laws and be represented by the same legislative assembly.” If the nobility and church 
insisted on living under different laws then they should be excluded from the nation; the third estate, 
those living under common law, was “everything” (Sieyes 1789). While this is not, of course, advocating 
a modern day Terror, it recognizes the French Revolution as foundational to the development of liberal 
democracy across the world. A return to Sieyes’ civic understanding of the nation means that it should 
not only be possible, but desirable, for the idea to be reclaimed as a space for solidarity, fundamental 
rights and equality, in opposition to multi-national corporations, international celebrity culture and the 
“weightless millionaires” that seem to exist beyond the realm of the nations that the rest of us inhabit, 
and who refuse to be subject to their laws. 
British social democracy has presented itself as powerless against these power-brokers of 
globalisation, as it is bound to the state and its borders. Yet there was a paradox implicit in New 
Labour’s view of globalization and the knowledge economy: on the one hand, these ideas claim that 
capital is no longer subject to states, it is free to roam where it pleases, while on the other hand it 
requires nations to compete with one another to function. Social democracy, unlike capitalism, is bound 
to the idea of the nation: states remain nation-states and their power can be reasserted in those terms. 
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The concept of the nation can be the locus of struggle against capitalist excess.
1
 For some this is a 
terrifying prospect, but in the absence of a new discourse of international federalism, or an as yet 
unimagined construction of collective solidarity, the nation-state remains essential to our Western 
democracies. We need to embrace a new vision of nationalism, “a civic identity which exists alongside 
other identities” (Johnson 2010, 80), in which the nation is not an ethnically determined relationship 
with a territory, but a conceptual space of a social contract that binds people, collective life and the 
processes of governance together against the atomizing forces of capital. The discovery of a progressive 
civic nationalism may not be the desired direction for many on the left, but it is an important strategic 
move that may well be transcended in the future, once the immediate challenges have been faced. 
The risk of digital networks facilitating the politics of the right is more real and more frightening than 
a left engagement with nation. Networked right-activism has powerfully manifested itself in the Tea 
Party movement in the USA and the English Defence League (EDL) in the UK. These virulent 
mobilisations of prejudice and reaction are dominating the discourse of the nation and shaping its 
politics. And they are bound, not just to the inequalities of racial exclusion, but also to an ideal of the 
state-less nation, and the retrenchment of the redistributive mechanisms of modern governance. These 
movements on the right have spread rapidly through digital networks and opposition to them has been 
slow. This is partly because, after the successful use of such technologies in Barack Obama’s election 
campaign, the left smugly thought the terrain of the digital network was theirs, even as Blue State 
Digital (the organisation behind the Democratic electoral machine) has sold itself to a global advertising 
giant. But it is also partly because this new right is occupying a real gap in the political imagination - and 
their grievances are material, even if their targets are born of hatred, misinformation and fear. 
                                                           
1
 That the weak nation plays into the hands of large corporations is currently bring illustrated in the depiction of 
the UK as 'Broken Britain', forced to privatise public services because of 'the markets', slash spending for fear of a 
neo-liberal academic deciding we should lose our triple A credit rating, and unable to collect corporate tax even 
when deemed entitled to by the European court! (Hawkes 2011) 
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In the UK, the democratic left has historically relied on the power of trade unions (themselves often 
a network) to organise opposition to the right and far right, constrain the powers of capital and 
challenge the dehumanising decision-making processes of the state. In an era when identity has shifted 
away from traditional class positions and the membership of unions has collapsed, the role of protectors 
of the people against these forces must fall to other forms of network too - the unions cannot shoulder 
the burden alone. We believe these are already being built in the new green movement and the pro-
tax/anti-cuts protests. 
While these movements are not intrinsically social democratic, alliances can and should be made 
with them in the face of seemingly intractable problems across the spectrum of left concerns. 
Realistically, social democracy, if it reinvents itself and its relation to place, the nation and the network 
is perhaps the only political model that can win consent for the necessary transformations for a greener 
and fairer economy while maintaining a commitment to fundamental rights. In short, we need a politics 
that is prepared to embrace and use state power, albeit in a less centralized and technocratic way than 
it has to date. 
The threat of an “energy crunch”, which enforces relocalisation through a sudden shrinking of the oil 
supply, is a case in point: both Transition Towns and the BNP have seen the coming crisis as a potentially 
positive moment for social regeneration, albeit from vastly different viewpoints (Hopkins, 2006; BNP 
2005). The state must facilitate the localism of Transition while combating the parochialism of the far 
right, especially when these differing interpretations of what constitutes the “local” play out against 
growing inequality. We need a confident state power that stands up to the anti-government discourse 
of the right and keeps spending, but we also need a state that trusts its people enough to relinquish 
control and allow the creativity, energy and power of those pursuing social democratic ends outside 




Transformations of the ‘network society’ 
To do this we must try to better understand how the techno-cultural shifts in the move towards 
a horizontal network society challenge political centralism and reorganise our economic lives. While 
embedded in history, the forms of social relating we wish to examine are necessarily novel; the speed of 
technological change, the rapidity of it spread across the globe and the sheer number of people making 
connections with one another across space have created challenges and possibilities unimaginable just 
two decades ago. To chart this transformation, we will remain within the frame of the sociologist 
Manuel Castells and his work over the last 15 years, borrowing some of his terminology and developing 
it, to briefly describe what we see as the emerging political struggles of contemporary Britain. 
The Information Age, Castells’ weighty trilogy produced in the second half of the 1990s, begins 
with the Rise of the Network Society (1996), in which networks are seen primarily as those of financial 
capital which operate in opposition to human values and needs: 
People increasingly organise their meaning not around what they do but on the basis of what they 
are, or believe they are. Meanwhile, on the other hand, global networks of instrumental 
exchanges selectively switch on and off individuals, groups, regions, and even countries, according 
to their relevance in fulfilling the goals processed in the network, in a relentless flow of strategic 
decisions. It follows a fundamental split between abstract, universal instrumentalism, and 
historically rooted, particularistic identities. Our societies are increasingly structured around a 
bipolar opposition between the Net and the Self. (3) 
 
This new order provides opportunities for those who are seen to be of value to the network (highly 
educated, flexible, ”self-programmable”) who gain value from each connection, but also excludes those 
seen to be valueless, making it harder for them to accrue value. In response to this growing inequality, 
those excluded (“the computer illiterate... consumption less groups, and... under communicated 
territories” (25)) begin to form “resistance identities” around this disconnection, leading to the growing 
importance of local, ethnic or religious identities.  
In this schema, financial capital inhabits a timeless space of flows while people inhabit the space 
of places. The majority of workers engage in generic labour in which they are interchangeable with any 
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other labourers around the globe, but are culturally individualised to relate through competition, so that 
collective action on the basis of class becomes less and less possible (476). Unable to work cooperatively 
across continents against the network of capital that controls them, identities of place grow ever more 
important. 
In The Power of Identity (1997) Castells takes these ideas further, examining the crisis of political 
legitimacy caused by globalisation that has “created a vacuum... filled with identity-based movements” 
(xxiii). These “resistance identities” use idioms of territory, or transport the communal ties of the village 
to the growing urban centres of the globalised world. These identities may still coincide with states, but 
these have “lost much of [their] sovereignty” (419), and besides, the state is generally rightly 
understood as colluding with the oppressive forces of capital. It is often smaller geographical territories - 
Wales, Catalonia - that command the strongest sense of identification and basis for mobilisation.
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Writing in 1997, when information and communication technologies (ICT) had already 
revolutionised the financial services but social interaction on the Internet was limited to “the cute but 
scarcely relevant practice of chat rooms” (Castells 2004, 14), it was too early to see the potential for new 
forms of digital networks to form “a planetary chain of resistance” (Waterman 2001, in Matterlart 2003, 
157), both embedded in localities and global in reach and outlook. For Castells, at this point, they are 
inherently too isolated. “However these identities resist, they barely communicate... with each other 
because they are built around sharply distinct principles, defining an 'in' and 'out'” (421). In contrast to 
resistance identities, “project identities”, built around issues such as feminism and environmentalism, 
aim to transform society as a whole, asserting a species wide commonality of experience. But without 
the mechanism of the interactive digital network, Castells cannot conceive of how these “networks of 
social change” (428) will be able to mobilise the power of local identity to global ends. 
                                                           
2
 Wales and Catalonia are, of course, (mostly) understood by their inhabitants as nations, and have claimed a 
degree of administrative sovereignty, but ultimately the “legitimate use of force” (Weber 1918) lies with the British 
and Spanish states. Westminster and the Cortes Generales thus become the source of legitimation for the 
dehumanising forces of neo-liberalism for Welsh and Catalan nationalists. 
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His perspective has changed somewhat five years later, in The Information Society and the 
Welfare State (2002), which looks at ICT development in Finland and contrasting it to Silicon Valley and 
Singapore. The combination of rapid dissemination of ICT equipment and skills has led, by this point, to 
Finland being one of the world leaders in the telecoms industry, but it has achieved this in conjunction 
with generous welfare provision, creating a “socially sustainable network society” (14) rather than one 
in which capital networks are at odds with human selves. There are three key points relevant to our 
analysis that mark this turning point in Castells’ thinking. 
Firstly, the state has allowed itself to be transformed by the possibilities of networks, developing 
an “informational welfare state” to deliver services, for example in the “seamless health care system, in 
which the customer does not have to be concerned with the boundaries between different 
organisations; all needs are served through one service point” (93). Secondly, civil society had been 
supported in the development of “social hackerism” – the beginnings of the “generative framework” of 
Zitrain (2008), where resources and space are given by the state for actions external to the state. 
Castells is clearly excited by the possibilities he foresees in, for example, parents using ICT to self-
organise sharing childcare responsibilities, or trade unions having collective e-mail addresses so they can 
organise “demonstration by click” (98). These two factors show that, by relinquishing certain forms of 
control, the state is able to harness the power of networks rather than find itself at odds with them.
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Finally, the integration of these tools has been understood as part of a strong Finnish national identity 
rather than opposed to it, which Castells sees as partly happy historical accident, arguing that the harsh 
climate created a pragmatic attitude to any new technology which might help survive the winters. By 
combining the digital with the national, and using the capabilities of ICT to deliver services and help 
people to work cooperatively, Finland has avoided many of the oppositions Castells warned of in The 
Rise of the Network Society. 
                                                           
3
 It is important to note that social hackerism is conceived of as additional to the core provision of the welfare 
state, not, as in the case of David Cameron’s “Big Society”, a replacement for it. 
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His excitement at the power of digital tools to create meaningful alternatives to the logic of 
capital flows becomes even more palpable in his most recent book, Communication Power (2009). By 
now, Web 2.0 has emerged, becoming a central part of the lives of the majority of the world’s rich and 
ever-growing numbers of the world’s poor. “We do not watch internet, as we watch TV. In practice, 
Internet users... live with the Internet” (64). While the traditional mass-media has been going through a 
period of massive concentration of ownership, online we have entered the era of “mass-self 
communication”, through SMS, blogs, vlogs, pod-casts, wiki, peer to peer sharing, etc. And although 
much of this might be rightly seen as a kind of “electronic autism” (66), communicating with no-one, 
there is nonetheless a “potential synergy between the rise of mass self communication and the 
autonomous capacity of civil societies around the world to shape the process of social change” (303). 
Indeed, real world effects of digital communications on political systems had already at this point been 
seen in as far apart as the Philippines, Korea, Ukraine, Ecuador, Thailand, Nepal, Burma, Chile, Spain and 
the United States (348-9). 
    Leading on from his construction of “project identities”, he notes that “the Internet has played an 
increasingly important role in the global movement to prevent global warming” (325). However, by 
focusing on the various online tools used by Friends of the Earth or the Stop Climate Change Coalition to 
raise their profile or mobilising action on or offline (323-325), Castells misses what is truly novel about 
the new green movement that has emerged in the last ten years: its growing plurality and diversity, the 
alliances being formed between previously disconnected issues (for example, links with trade unions) 
and its ability to link up “resistance identities” embedded in localities. These linkages are what we term 
“identity networks”, creating political impact through mass horizontal action, “local at all points”, like 
Latour’s railroad train, even if “it takes you from Brest to Vladivostock” (Latour 1993, 117). Rather than 
Al Gore as the celebrity spokesman for the environmental project identity - a “weightless millionaire” if 





It is our contention that the new green movement has developed, in the last ten years, from being 
polarised between the “resistance identities” of individual battles over specific locations and the 
“project identities” concerned with global emissions, to a more subtle and nuanced “identity network”. 
Friends of the Earth and Stop Climate Chaos were pivotal in passing the Climate Change Bill in 2008, but 
this was essentially an old-school lobbying job, operating through fairly traditional channels with some 
cosmetic online tinkering. An example of where the “identity network” can be seen at work is in the 
loose coalition formed to stop the third runway at Heathrow, mapped by John Stewart in Victory Against 
All Odds: How the Heathrow campaign was won (2010). The campaign drew together a potent 
combination of groups, organisations and figures, from the West Londoners connected through the 
noise pollution of the planes over their heads (HACAN), the villagers of Sipson, Harlington and 
Harmondsworth fighting the destruction of their homes (NoTRAG), the celebrities who bought and 
publicised the Greenpeace “Airplot” (Emma Thompson, Zac Goldsmith, Alistair McGowan), the 
politicians from all parties who kept the issue live in Parliament (John McDonnell, John Gummer) and 
the activists in Climate Camp and Plane Stupid who linked the debate to the global fight against climate 
change. While remaining separate, tactics and resources were shared, personal connections were 
formed, and the actants involved were transformed. 
Climate Camp made itself ‘local’ for a week by holding the 2007 camp in a field next to the 
airport; celebrities made themselves neighbours by buying the Airplot; John McDonnell MP took direct 
action, picking up the mace in the House of Commons; HACAN held 40 public meetings attended by 
20,000 during the official consultation period, the end of which was publicised by Plane Stupid’s 
headline grabbing banner drop off the Houses of Parliament. Throughout the campaign, global and local, 
online and offline, “project identities” and “resistance identities” were blended to make a compelling 
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case that this was an authentic expression of “the people” against a corporate giant and a remote and 
unrepresentative state. It was understood simultaneously as an issue affecting the villagers of Sipson, 
the residents of West London, the millions of other locals affected by airport expansion (connected 
through the AirportWatch network), and the billions around the world who will suffer from climate 
change in their own localities. Thousands signed up online to become ‘beneficial owners’ of the 
Greenpeace Airplot, a piece of land in the proposed path of the new runway, which was chalked in giant 
letters, so as to be visible from the planes above it, with the emotive phrase: “Our Climate, Our Land” 
(Greenpeace 2009). And these transformations have had effects beyond the immediate aims of the 
campaign. Activists who “adopted” residents have remained friends with them. John McDonnell has 
become a frequent spokesperson on climate change in Parliament. The Airplot has become a community 
garden. Members of Plane Stupid used their funders to buy a house next to the airport, and have now 
set up Transition Town Sipson.  
Identity networks can mobilise on a substantial scale and have real political effects, creating 
solidarity across space while maintaining the complexity of the particular. But the network that formed 
to stop the third runway emerged in a vacuum of the nation as a sphere of political action. It 
constructed a narrative that tied the disparate project and resistance identities together in a way that 
not only asserted the interest of the various participants of the campaign on global and local scales 
against the intermediary of the national; it was also a campaign that was intrinsically anti-state, peaking 
with the banner drop declaring the Palace of Westminster to be the headquarters of BAA. 
 This is not a criticism of the campaign. What emerged was a semi-organic strategy to combat an 
abuse of state power that put local and global concerns at odds with a limited vision of the national 
interest.  This limited vision is one in which politicians see the state as a weak force against the tides of 
globalisation and the fluidity of capital. Its role becomes nothing more than ensuring that the nation is 
not “switched off” in the logic of Castells’ network society – indeed, it could be argued that New 
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Labour’s policy framework was predicated on the idea that they were powerless to do anything except 
mitigate the worst excess of global capital through modest redistribution. The Heathrow campaign 
refused to accept that notion and won. They won partially because they were dogged, determined and 
right, but they also won because, while New Labour were operating under the logics of the network 
society of the 1990s where global capital was king, the campaign was at the vanguard of the new, 
democratised social-network society in which capital is just one way of forming links between people 
and groups.  Contrary to the arguments of BAA, the victory of the Heathrow campaign did not mean 
some sudden loss of British competitiveness in the global economy. Instead it provided a model for 
other protest groups across Europe (and indeed the world) to follow. For the “weightless millionaires” of 
network capitalism this is a wakeup call. Capital may be highly fluid and mobile, but it multiplies in 
places that are very much physical and real. It needs access to markets and infrastructure: things that 
are provided by nations and states. There is a real political strength in this realisation that state and 
nation have the power to control who, how and why the interaction between people and capital occurs.  
Thus we are at a moment for social democracy to reassert itself and the redistributive state as 
inextricably linked to the idea of the nation of people under common law and with common values. The 
emerging battle against cuts to libraries in the UK is adopting the sort of identity network model to 
embrace as we write: while each fight is against an individual council, they are connected through online 
tools like falseeconomy.org.uk, and sharing messages and tactics, such as “mass borrowing” all the 
books in the library in protest (BBC 2011a; BBC 2011b). The geographical attachment to the particular 
becomes simultaneously a national attachment to the idea of literacy, education and learning as a public 
good. These sorts of campaigns enable the democratic left to build a consensus around core values: the 
local group ties to a national message which asserts a universal right. Literacy is a common good, which 
we do not compete over, its benefit grows for all as more of us become literate.  
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The “wrong sort” of identity network 
While anti-cuts campaigners are rediscovering the link between national values and state 
provision, the rise of the EDL is a consequence of the disconnect between statist governance and the 
discourse of nation. They play on the localism agenda, telling those left behind by globalisation that their 
geographical ties make them important and deserving of privilege. As a global phenomenon, the 
resistance identities that drive this new localist fascism are increasingly finding common ground with 
similar movements, despite their different nationalisms; “identity networks” are not just the property of 
the left, the greens, the privileged or those we would naturally think of as ‘”international”. The British 
far-right now participate in online and off-line networks across Europe and the Atlantic, made up of like-
minded people who share their concerns, fears and prejudices. Participation in far-right networks can 
transform their understanding of their own disadvantage and engender a vital sense of agency in the 
world in which they are powerless. Rather than being a relic of an old East End or the post-industrial 
north, the EDL are active participants in 21st century global neo-fascism, a movement reported by the 
media and influencing governments across Europe and North America. 
How can the left response to this threat? Certainly not merely through the mechanisms of 
increased central control. Fighting the EDL on the streets, locking up their members or banning them for 
inciting racial hatred plays into the narrative of victimisation which attracted groups of alienated young 
men in the first place. Just as the increased surveillance and infringement of civil liberties following 
September 11 have further distanced young British Muslims from the state - indeed, have transformed 
their sense of identity so that, for many, religion has become its most central aspect (Saeed 2008) - 
trying to stamp out the EDL by force fundamentally misunderstands it aims. Unlike the National Front in 
the 1970s, which sought to demonstrate power through overt clashes with anti-fascists and police, the 
EDL is not attempting to take on the state on its own terms (Burghart and Zeskind 2010). It exercises a 
different sort of power, stoking up existing tensions within limited geographical areas, and giving its 
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actions collective force through sharing information, strategies, resources and press contacts through 
horizontal, digitally mediated networks. The EDL pose a new sort of threat and will require new sorts of 
solutions that it would be foolish to pretend to have already worked out; but building links between 
isolated 'locals' along the lines of Hope Not Hate's successful campaigns against the BNP, combined with 
social democracy reclaiming the national, might offer a way forward. 
 As new digital technologies become more widely available they offer both sides of the political 
divide the opportunity to build or maintain identity networks, either with similarly alienated groups, 
those in solidarity with common political projects, or with people experiencing comparable forms of 
oppression around the world. When linked to fundamental principles of equality, respect or the 
environment, these identity networks can be transformative and emancipatory, but there is also the 
possibility of reactionary localisms and fragmentary cultural fundamentalisms. The processes and 
technologies that have created the alterglobalisation and new green movements, linked the EDL up with 




Political power is increasingly being wielded by those that embrace the network logic. Movements 
are organising and acting without the formalised structures expected by political parties, and yet they 
are shaping the trajectory of politics and forcing policy makers to meet them and their agendas. From 
the Tea Party in the USA to the student occupations of 2010 in the UK, these movements are remoulding 
the political space in which decisions are made. They are intrinsically oppositional to elite structures and 
are resilient enough that they cannot be easily suppressed, operating to a “starfish” model that cannot 
be decapitated (Brafman and Beckstrom 2006). 
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     These movements use social networks to affiliate, but also to organise and disseminate 
information horizontally at a pace that cannot be suppressed by state intelligence apparatus without 
unacceptable levels of oppression – unacceptable to liberal democracies but equally to the seamless 
functioning of modern capitalism. You cannot crush one, without shutting down the other. The potential 
of this speedy dissent was used to great effect to organise the “Facebook strikes” in Egypt in 2008 and 
the anti-government protests in Tehran orchestrated through Twitter in 2009 (Hands 2011, 1). Indeed, it 
is a similar principle, which Armand Mattelart terms “netwar”, that enables terrorist organisations and 
guerrilla networks to continue to operate and key members to evade capture despite decades of pursuit 
by the world’s most formidable military power (2003, 131). By using the same tools to organize that 
make capital so fluid, these oppositional movements are physically embedded in the structures they 
seek to overturn. 
     Networks can respond at great speed, sharing ideas and creating resistance far faster than the 
NGOs, trade unions and pressure groups that make up traditional left activism. We have seen UKUncut 
scaling up from a one off event to dozens of regular protests across the country in a matter of weeks. By 
creating a loose network with an open collaborative website at its heart (ukuncut.org.uk), it has 
succeeded in orchestrating action in a national frame while maintaining local autonomy, marrying social 
democratic principles with a participatory, informal organisational structure that is functionally 
leaderless. More significantly, its traditional left-wing calls for fair tax-and-spend, alongside an assault 
on wealthy tax dodgers and multinational corporations, has won approval from such bastions of 
tradition as the Daily Mail in its appeal to a “fair play” model of Britishness (Daily Mail 2010).  
This recourse to national identity refocuses attention on the real villains of the “network society”, by 
targeting the double standards previously assumed to be the right of the mobile elite in a global 
capitalist society. This is the call of Sieyes revisited, the assertion of the rights of the Third Estate against 
those that consider themselves beyond the common law of the nation. Through the vistas of the 
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network society, asking people to pay their taxes is a revolutionary call and it may well spread.  As we 
write, the organisation is starting to build European connections, expanding its targets to include the tax 
havens that make such a system possible. Defending the nation in this manner becomes a global good 
that values the equally strong assertions of fellow nations. This is the spirit of a new nationalism that 
builds its ideology upon fair taxation, cross-cultural solidarity, and the rights and privileges of an open 
and interactive model of empowered citizenship. 
Digital networks are tools which expose the material networks of our collective lives, providing 
new platforms for insurgent politics that can challenge the inhuman networks of capital. They empower 
the individual, by placing them at the heart of a web of connections of their own construction, yet they 
also enable a collective response to emerge with rapidity. Increasingly, those using these tools are 
exercising political power (Little 2010). There has been a tendency to techno-fetishism that sees digital 
media as inherently emancipatory, and the chief threats to their ability to deliver equality coming from 
the state and the corporations who dominate the web (Hands 2011). This argument fails to see that a 
politics based around networks could be profoundly different depending upon its ideological frame. 
Networks are ambivalent to the priorities of previous political constructions: they can deliver the 
equality project of the left, or the hatred and bigotry of the far right. This makes the necessary 
relinquishing of central control a risky business, and one that the left has often used as justification for 
increased state intervention. New Labour, for example, presided over an unprecedented era of state 
intrusion and surveillance over its citizens, largely in response to the threat of purported terrorist and 
paedophile networks (Porter 2009). Even if this was an adequate or reasonable response in the past, it is 
no longer tenable as a way to move forward with an emerging generation of vocal and politically minded 
“network natives”. 
The political formations that have led to this point have left us with a dislocated and fractured 
sense of who we are, but the same formations are the material out of which we will build the 
19 
 
operational and ideological collectivities of the future. The gaps in our social consciousness around the 
national, and its status as an area of contestation, are a huge flashpoint in the interim between the 
current moment in political thinking and the ideas and alliances that will emerge in the decades ahead. 
For now, social democracy must be the ideological force that leads the battle for that space in its own 
terms and under its own values and logics. Not as a bulwark against the relentless movement of capital, 
but as a positive ideology that champions an inclusive state that empowers people directly. In the 
meantime, this will give space for the new political formations of the left to emerge and develop. There 
are many reasons to be hopeful, and there are a wealth of ideas emerging around collaborative 
consumption (Botsman and Rogers 2010), co-production (NEF 2008), corporate co-operativism (Grant 
2010) and so on. Out of the current moment could emerge any number of progressive political 
programmes, from an internationalist network syndicalism that flourishes in the spaces capitalism 
leaves behind, to a digital corporate welfarism emerging out of the Finnish experience recounted by 
Castells. 
Our politics must reshape itself in an era when social networks become the key locus of struggle, 
not just for the spirit of the nation, but also for policy making, service delivery and the market. 
Moreover, social democracy can and should adapt to this new terrain for its own sake, because the 
cultural shifts happening around digital network technologies could potentially be the heralds of a new 
order that is both more social and more democratic. The concomitant risk is that if we do not, networks 
will come to be dominated by corporate interests and the far right, who seek to use them for anti-social 
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